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Abstract
We formulate a horizontal differentiation model with price-sensitive demand and
asymmetric transport costs, in the context of transport scheduling. Two com-
petitors choose fares and departure times in a fixed time interval. Consumers
are distributed uniformly along the interval; their location indicates their de-
sired departure time. In a standard Hotelling model, locations are chosen before
prices. In our context, the opposite order is also conceivable, but we show that
it does not result in a Nash equilibrium; the same is true for a game in both vari-
ables are chosen simultaneously. We also discuss Stackelberg game structures
and second-best regulation.
We conclude that the addition of price-sensitive demand results in equilibria
in the traditional Hotelling model with price setting; there, services are sched-
uled closer together than optimal. We also show that it is possible to include
asymmetric schedule delay functions. Our results show that departure times can
be strategic instruments. Optimal regulatory strategies depend on the value of
schedule delay, and on whether the regulator can commit.
Keywords: Horizontal differentiation, scheduling, transport.
JEL Classification: L11, L51, L91, R40.
1. Introduction
Hotelling’s (1929) classic paper on horizontal differentiation shows that,
when two firms compete on locations and a fixed number of consumers buy
from the closest firm, the two firms locate as closely together as possible. Later
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work has generalized Hotelling’s model in several ways; most importantly, to also
include price-setting behaviour, which results in the absence of a pure-strategy
equilibrium when combined with linear transport costs, and to maximum dif-
ferentiation when combined with quadratic transport costs (d’Aspremont et al.,
1979).
Most analyses have kept the assumptions that demand at every location is
perfectly inelastic, and that the user costs of travelling are independent of di-
rection. Puu (2002) does formulate a Hotelling model with elastic demand, in
which locations and prices are determined simultaneously, but his calculations
have been shown to be flawed (Sanner, 2005). Colombo (2011) includes elas-
tic demand and asymmetric travel costs, but his model is unidirectional: travel
costs in one direction are infinite. Gu and Wenzel (2012) formulate a general Sa-
lop model with elastic demand, but their formulation is unfortunate, in that the
distance between consumers and their suppliers negatively affects their utility,
but their demand is a function of the price only; not of the transport costs.
The two assumptions mentioned above may yield good approximations in
many applications, but in some others, they are clear oversimplifications. One
obvious example is the scheduling of transport services in a certain fixed time
interval. There, demand is usually price-sensitive, since people can choose not
to travel or alternative modes of transport are available, amongst other reasons.
Furthermore, Hotelling’s ‘travel costs’ in this setting represent the costs of sched-
ule delay, and the cost of being late is usually higher than the cost of being early
(e.g. Small, 1982). This scheduling problem has received limited attention in
the literature; the only study known to us assumes perfectly inelastic demand
(van Reeven and Janssen, 2006). It concludes that an additional characteristic,
such as service quality, is necessary to obtain a pure-strategy equilibrium, and
even then, this equilibrium only exists if passengers are relatively insensitive to
the departure time.
To generalize Hotelling’s model, we formulate a horizontal differentiation
model with price-sensitive demand and asymmetric transport costs. We do so
in the context of transport scheduling. Although our models can be applied in
many other instances, such as telecommunications markets (e.g. as a generaliza-
tion of Cancian et al., 1995), we use the scheduling problem; not only because
it is a natural example, but also because of the relative lack of literature on the
subject.
As in a traditional horizontal differentiation model, two competitors choose
a location on a fixed interval. In our case, this is an interval in time, such
that the two locations are departure times of a transport service. The two
competitors also set their fares. Consumers are distributed uniformly along the
interval; their location indicates their desired departure time, such that they
face a schedule delay cost that increases in the deviation from their desired
departure time. Hence, they minimize their generalized price, which is the sum
of the fare and their schedule delay costs.
Most Hotelling models would assume that the two competitors choose their
locations or departure times first, after which fares are set. In scheduling, the
opposite order is also conceivable, but we show that this game does not have
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a Nash equilibrium; the same is true for a game in which fares and departure
times are chosen simultaneously. We first find the equilibrium fares and de-
parture times, examine under which conditions equilibria exist, and compare
them to the social optimum, assuming that schedule delay costs early and late
are equal. Contrary to other horizontal differentiation models, notably that of
d’Aspremont et al. (1979), the competitors schedule their services closer together
than optimal. We then analyse how these equilibria change if the schedule delay
cost late is higher than the schedule delay cost early, and show that the resulting
equilibria can still be stable. Finally, we analyse Stackelberg game structures,
which increase the parameter space in which equilibria exist, and comment on
optimal second-best regulation.
2. Methodology
Consider a departure time choice and fare game between two duopolistic
suppliers of a scheduled transport service. Consumers have different preferences
over desirble departure times and, given this desired departure time, there is an
elastic demand for trips. Specifically, travel demand d (t), at any time t ∈ [−1, 1],
is a linear function1 of the generalized price p(t). Since demand cannot be
negative
d(t) = Max [a− bp(t), 0] (1)
which holds for all t. The total consumer surplus can then be calculated as
CS =
1
2
ˆ 1
−1
d (t)
(a
b
− p(t)
)
dt =
1
2b
ˆ 1
−1
(d(t)) 2dt (2)
Operators choose a fare fi and departure time ti; this assumes that each operator
schedules only one service in the observed time interval. Operator profits are
given by
pii = Difi − F (3)
where Di is the total demand for its service and F is the fixed cost associated
with the operation of the service; marginal per-passenger costs are assumed
to be zero. Social welfare the sum of consumer surplus and operator profits,
CS +
∑
i pii.
The generalized price pi (t) of service i, taken by a consumer with preferred
departure time t, is the sum of the fare and the schedule delay cost. Schedule
delay costs are assumed to be linear, but not necessarily symmetric, such that
the unit cost of schedule delay when a passenger is late (γ) can differ from the
unit cost of schedule delay when a passenger is early (β):
pi(t) = fi +Max[γ(ti − t), 0] +Max[β(t− ti), 0] (4)
1In most Hotelling models, t ∈ [0, 1], but the present specification yields more compact
expressions, without affecting the conclusions.
3
Passengers choose the service that minimizes the generalized price they pay,
so in equilibrium, their generalized price p(t) = Min[pi(t), pi+1(t), ..., pI(t)]. If
there are only two operators, and the equilibrium demand for each operator’s
service is strictly positive, we can define the inner market boundary point t∗, at
which passengers are indifferent between the two operators as
t∗ = (f2 − f1 + βt1 + γt2)/(β + γ) (5)
where, by construction, operator 1 schedules the first service. The total demand
for each operator’s service, D1 and D2, can then be calculated as
D1 =
ˆ t1
−1
Max[a−b(f1+γ(t1− t), 0]dt+
ˆ t∗
t1
Max[a−b(f1+β(t− t1), 0]dt (6)
and
D2 =
ˆ t2
t∗
Max[a− b(f2+γ(t2− t), 0]dt+
ˆ 1
t2
Max[a− b(f2+β(t− t2), 0]dt (7)
where t∗ is given by Eq. 5.
3. Social optimum
Since there are no externalities associated with demand, and the operator’s
marginal costs are zero, the social optimum can be found by simply maximizing
total demand. This implies that both fares should be equal to zero2. Assuming
that, in the social optimum, d(−1), d(t∗), d(1) > 0, meaning that there is positive
demand from all preferred arrival times, maximizing the sum of Eqs. 6 and 7
gives the social welfare-maximizing departure times:
{
tSW1 , t
SW
2
}
=
{
− γ
β + γ
,
β
β + γ
}
(8)
This implies that, if β = γ, the socially optimal departure times are at −1/2 and
1/2. If the cost of departing late is higher than the cost of departing early, both
departures shift to an earlier time, such that more passengers depart early. Note,
however, that this assumes that demand is strictly positive for any t ∈ [−1, 1].
Substituting the zero fares and Eq. 8 into Eq. 1, this implies that
a
b
− βγ
β + γ
> 0 (9)
If this condition is not met, the social optimum must be a fully separated
equilibrium, such that there exists a t for which demand is zero. In that case,
2We will disregard the possibility of setting an infinitely negative fare.
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the optimal fares are still equal to zero, so any {t1, t2}that satisfies d(−1) =
d(t∗) = d(1) = 0 is an equilibrium, as social welfare does not depend on the
exact departure times, and therewith the exact desired arrival times served.
Shifting to an earlier time will allow more passengers with an earlier desired
departure time to travel, but keeps exactlty the same number of passengers
with later desired departure times from travelling, such that the net effect on
welfare is zero.
4. Full market separation
It may be optimal for two operators to set their fares and departure times
such that d(−1) = d(t∗) = d(1) = 0, so that their markets are fully separated
and each operator acts as a monopolist on its own segment. In this case, there
exists a desired departure time that is so far away from both services that
nobody with this desired departure time travels. To examine when this would
happen, consider a single monopolistic operator who can set any departure time
and fare, and faces the linear demand function in Eq. 1 for all t ∈ R, such that
it is not constrained by a fixed time period.
Solving Eq. 1 to obtain the passengers with the earliest and latest desired
departure times that are travelling in this situation gives
{t, t¯} =
{
t1 − a− bf1
γb
, t1 +
a− bf1
βb
}
(10)
This operators profits are then
pi1 =
ˆ t¯
t
d(t)dt− F = f1 (β + γ)(a− bf1)
2
2βγb
− F (11)
Naturally, these profits do not depend on the operator’s departure time choice,
since there is now no unique fixed time period. The operator’s profit in Eq. 11
is maximized when
f1 = a/(3b) (12)
Substituting this back in Eq. 10 gives the passengers with the earliest and latest
desired departure times, as a function of the parameters:
{t, t¯} =
{
t1 − 2a
3γb
, t1 +
2a
3βb
}
(13)
Only if t − t ≤ 1 can two fully separated monopolists with fares as in Eq. 13
operate between t = −1 and t = 1. This implies that
2(β + γ)a
3βγb
≤ 1 (14)
Hence, a fully separated equilibrium is more likely to occur when the maximum
number of passengers for a given t (a) is smaller, when the demand sensitivity (b)
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is higher3, for higher costs of schedule delay, and for a larger difference between
the cost of schedule delay late and the cost of schedule delay earlier. However,
operators can only recover their costs if pii ≥ 0. Using Eq. 10, this implies that
2(β + γ)a3
27βγb2
≥ F (15)
This, conversely, is less likely to occur when the maximum number of passengers
is smaller, the demand sensitivity is higher, and for higher costs of schedule de-
lay. In the absence of any subsidies, Eqs. 14 and 15 can only hold simultaneously
if F ≤ a2/(9b).
5. Equilibria with covered markets
Having derived when a separated equilibrium occurs, we can now examine
the various possibilities for an equilibrium in which the market is entirely cov-
ered, such that the two operators compete for the marginal customer. If Eq. 14
does not hold, D(−1), D(t∗), D(1) > 0, since it would be suboptimal to stay in
a situation where D1(−1) or D2(1) equal zero while D(t∗) > 0, and vice versa.
The resulting equilibrium is considerably more complicated that the fully sepa-
rated one, which is why we will start by assuming that β = γ. In order to derive
tractable results, before we consider asymmetric schedule delay costs.
In this case, the equilibrium fares and departure times depend on the order in
which they are chosen if a sequential game structure is allowed. We will examine
three possibilities: either fares and departure times are chosen simultaneously, or
departure times are chosen first, while fares are chosen only after the departure
times have been fixed, or vice versa. In all cases, we initially assume Nash
behaviour, moving to Stackelberg games in section 6.
5.1. Simultaneous departure time and fare choice
Puu (2002) analyses a Hotelling game in which locations and prices are
chosen simultaneously, and derives an equilibrium where both suppliers charge
equal prices, and t1 = −t2. However, as Sanner (2005) shows, this equilibrium
only appears to be stable because of a calculation error. In reality, each operator
could obtain a higher profit by choosing the same location as its competitor,
while undercutting its competitor’s price with an arbitrarily small amount. It
would then serve the entire market of its competitor, plus at least part of its
own original market. Hence, in this situation, no stable equilibrium exists.
This result continues to hold if there are more than two competitors or
if demand functions are nonlinear, for the same reason; it is always possible
for one competitor to take its direct neighbour’s place and undercut its price
by an arbitrarily small amount, and then obtain the full market. As long as
3Note that the effecits of b runs via its impact on demand, given a. In particular, for a
given price and with equal a, the demand elasticity is independent of b
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the two operators were competing for the marginal customer, the profit of the
undercutting competitor will then increase. Only if one of the operators sets
its fares and locations before the other can an equilibrium exist; we will briefly
examine this game in section 6 below.
5.2. Fares chosen before departure times
We can find the equilibrium by backward induction, first solve ∂pii∂ti = 0
for i = {1, 2} to obtain the optimal departure times, substituting these in the
operators’ profit functions, and then solving for the optimal fares. The optimal
timing response function for both operators are
{t1, t2} =
{
−4
5
+
1
5β
(
2
a
b
− 3f1 + f2
)
+
t2
5
,
4
5
− 1
5β
(
2
a
b
+ f1 − 3f2
)
+
t1
5
}
(16)
Solving Eq. 16 to obtain the equilibrium departure times t∗i (f1, f2) gives
{t∗1t∗2} =
{
−2
3
+
1
3β
(a
b
− 2f1 + f2
)
,
2
3
− 1
3β
(a
b
+ f1 − 2f2
)}
(17)
The equilibrium fares can then be obtained by solving ∂pii|{t1=t
∗
1 ,t2=t
∗
2}
∂fi
= 0,
which gives optimal response functions4
fi =
16a
39b
+
10
39
(fj + β)− 1
39
√
334
(a
b
)2
− 460(fj + β)a
b
+ 295(fj + β)2 (18)
These derivations are tedious, and the resulting expressions have no intuitive
interpretation.
The optimal response functions can be solved to obtain the equilibrium fares.
However, this equilibium is not stable. Substituting the equilibrium fares into
the cross-partial derivatives of Eq. 18, ∂fi/∂fj , results in a tedious expression
which, however, is smaller than one for any positive β. This means that un-
dercutting strategies are profitable as long as the operators are making positive
profits. Instead of setting a fare equal to Eq. 18, any of the two competitors
could set its fare an arbitrarily small amount lower. The other would then also
adjust its fare, but by a smaller amount, since ∂fi/∂fj < 1. In the timing
subgame, this competitor could then simply choose the other’s departure time;
with its lower fare, it would get the entire market. Since both competitors can
use this undercutting strategy profitably as long as positive profits are made,
the equilibrium is never stable.
This result continues to hold if the value of schedule delay early is higher
than the value of schedule delay late. In that case, equilibrium profits are likely
to be asymmetric, so undercutting may only be a profitable strategy for one of
the operators, but this still results in instability. The same is true if demand or
schedule delay function are non-linear; as long as ∂fi/∂fj < 1 for at least one of
the operators, and as long as the operators compete for the marginal traveller,
any equilibrium where positive profits are made is unstable.
4As well as one other root, which corresponds to the minimum profit.
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5.3. Departure times chosen before fares
Symmetric schedule delay costs (β = γ)
Again, we find the equilibrium by backward induction. Solving ∂pii∂fi = 0 for
i = {1, 2} gives the optimal fare response functions for both operators. Solving
these gives the fare equilibrium:
f∗1 =
a
2β
+ β
(
2 +
5
4
t1 +
3
4
t2
)
− 1
4b√
4
(a
b
)2
+
4βa
b
(t1 − t2) + β2 (80 + 112t1 + 45t21 + 48t2 + 22t1t2 + 13t22) (19)
f∗2 =
a
2β
+ β
(
2− 3
4
t1 − 5
4
t2
)
− 1
4b√
4
(a
b
)2
+
4βa
b
(t1 − t2) + β2 (80− 112t2 + 45t22 − 48t1 + 22t1t2 + 13t21) (20)
Again, these derivations are tedious, and the resulting equations have no straight-
forward intuitive interpretation. Substituting them back in the original profit
functions and maximizing each operator’s profit with respect to its departure
times gives the equilibrium departure times. These do not have a closed form,
and can only be evaluated numerically, which we will do below. What is impor-
tant to note here is that in this game undercutting is not a profitable strategy.
Rather than an arbitrarily small deviation from the first-stage subgame equi-
librium, a successful undercutting strategy now requires an operator to take its
competitor’s place; a major deviation. The other operator will respond with an
equally large deviation, and take the place previously occupied by the under-
cutting operator; none of them will gain.
We can also establish the interval in which an equilibrium exists. By con-
struction, −1 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ 1. In this game, these conditions are met only when
β ≥ 6a31b . For a smaller β, there is no equilibrium. For β ≥ 4a3b , the equilibrium
is separated. Using these bounds, it is also possible to calculate the range of
{t∗1, t∗2}:
lim
β→ 4a3b
t∗1 = −
1
2
, lim
β→ 6a31b
t∗1 =
1
2
(21)
So, the two services are closer together than socially optimal. This is an im-
portant difference from many other horizontal differentiation models, notably
that of d’Aspremont et al. (1979), in which competitors locate as far apart from
each other as possible, such that they can exert local market power. The reason
that this does not happen here is that, in our model, demand is price-sensitive.
If one operator schedules its service further from the other, this does indeed
decrease competition at the inner market boundary, allowing it to increase its
fares in the second stage, as Eqs. 19–20 show. However, by doing so, it will also
lose costumers with a desired departure time between the two services since, for
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these travellers, both schedule delay costs and fares have increased. Of course,
this will also shift the inner market boundary.
Hence, each operator’s departure time must be closer to the inner market
boundary than to the closest outer market boundary, precisely because the
latter is fixed, while the former moves in the same direction as a change in one
operator’s departure time. How close it must be exactly depends on the optimal
fare, and hence, on the value of schedule delay. When β approaches 6a/(31b),
the optimal two departure times approach 0, and when β is even smaller, the two
operators will continuously swap places; no stable equilibrium emerges. When
β is large, however, market areas are small, so the incentive to try and steal a
competitor’s customers is smaller, and hence, the departure times are set further
apart.
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Figure 1: Setting departure times before fares (a/b = 10, γ = β)
Fig. 1 shows the equilibrium fares, profits, departure times and social welfare
relative to the optimum, for the range of values of schedule delay where an equi-
librium exists. As already indicated by Eq. 21, departure times move further
apart if the value of schedule delay increases. Fares and profits, however, are
non-monotonic in β. This is because an increase in the value of schedule delay
has two effects. Firstly, an increase in β directly decreases the number of trav-
ellers, for any set of fares and departure times, as travel costs for all commuters
increase. This will reduce optimal fares and profits. However, if travel costs
for all commuters increase, they also increase for the marginal commuters, who
have a desired departure time t = t∗. Hence, there will also be fewer marginal
commuters, which will reduce competition. This allows operators to increase
their fares and profits. As Fig. 1 shows, this competitive effect dominates for
smaller values of schedule delay. For larger values, the optimal departure times
are already so far apart that the demand effect is stronger.
Social welfare, relative to the optimum, always decreases in the value of
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schedule delay. For low values of schedule delay, this is because fares are in-
creasing in β and thus moving away from the optimum; although the departure
times are moving closer to the optimum, this is less important, given that the
values of schedule delay are relatively low. For higher values of schedule delay
fares start decreasing slightly, but deviations from the optimal departure time
are now so costly that although the departure times are moving towards the
optimum, they are not moving too slowly to offset the negative effect of an
increase in β on welfare.
Asymmetric schedule delay functions (γ > β)
If schedule delay functions are not symmetric in each commuter’s desired de-
parture time, operators in the resulting equilibrium will charge different fares,
and their departure times will not be at equal distances from zero. This compli-
cates the analysis and, hence, this situation can only be evaluated numerically.
Fig. 2 shows, for β = 5 and a/b = 10, the fares, departure times, operator
profits and social welfare for a range of γ. Although, naturally, the exact func-
tions are specific to these particular parameters, other parameters result in very
similar figures. Moreover, all variables only depend on the ratio between β and
a/b; not on the individual levels of these parameters.
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Figure 2: Effects of γ > β (a/b = 10, β = 5)
Naturally, if the value of schedule delay late increases relative to the value
of schedule delay early, both departures will move to an earlier time, such that
fewer commuters are late. In an effort to gain the largest market share, both
do so at a faster rate than the socially optimal departure times tSi . Hence,
the first operator’s departure time initially moves closer to the optimum, while
the second operator’s departure time, which is already earlier than optimal,
continuously moves away from the optimum.
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For moderate deviations of γ from β, this allows both operators to increase
their fares. However, the first operator’s market size decreases as it is squeezed
towards its outer market boundary, and this reduces its profits. For large in-
creases in γ, even the second operator loses, as demand for its service decreases
too fast to be offset by its favourable position. Social welfare decreases in γ,
relative to the first-best, as a result of higher prices, a less optimal departure
time of the second operator and of course, in the same way as an increase in β,
simply because suboptimal departure times become more costly.
6. Other games
As we have seen, games with simultaneous fare and timing choices never
have pure strategy Nash equilibria and in games where either fares or departure
times are chosen first equilibria only exist for limited ranges of parameters.
It is therefore worth investigating which other game structures could result in
equilibria where the above games fail. For the sake of brevity and simplicity, will
limit our attention to situations with symmetric schedule delay cost functions,
although, like before, it is possible to include asymmetries.
6.1. Stackelberg games
Stackelberg games, in which one operator sets its fare, departure time, or
both before the other operator, may be a realistic representation of some real-
world transport markets. A large operator, which is active not just in one market
but operates many routes may, for example, have to decide on its fares and de-
parture times much earlier than a small, flexible operator that only participates
in one market. In this case, the operator that publishes its decisions first can
choose them in such a way that it cannot be profitably undercut by the second
operator. We will examine the Stackelberg equivalents of the three Nash games
above: one situation in which the first operator sets its fare and departure time
before the other, one in which the first operator sets its departure time before
the other, followed by a separate second stage in which the operators set their
fares in the same order, and the reverse, one in which the first operator sets its
fare before the other, followed by a sequential departure time choice.
Fares and departure times set simultaneously per firm, and sequentially between
firms
If the first operator decides on both its fare and its departure time before
the other, and can commit to these decisions, it will choose them such that
undercutting is not a profitable strategy for the second operator. This does
mean that it has to accept a lower profit than it would get in some of the
other games. Starting with the second stage, the second operator’s optimal
fares and departure times {t∗2(t1, f1), f∗2 (t1, f1)} can be found by simply setting
∂pi2
∂t2
= ∂pi2∂f2 = 0. The first operator than maximizes its own profits subject to
not only{t∗2, f∗2 }, but also another constraint, which specifies that the second
operator’s profit must be greater or equal to the profit it would get if it took
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the first operator’s departure time, and set its fare an arbitrarily small amount
lower:
pi∗2 ≥
ˆ t¯
−1
a− b(f1 +Max[γ(t1 − t), 0] +Max[β(t− t1), 0]dt− F (22)
where pi∗2 is the seond operator’s equilibrium profit, and t¯ = Min
[
t1 +
a−bf1
βb , 1
]
.
Since this constraint will be binding for any set of parameters, Eq. 22 can be
solved as a strict equality and used to substitute out one of the first operator’s
decision variables. Since the constraint is nonlinear, and the resulting equilib-
rium will have asymmetric departure times and unequal fares, this game can
only be solved numerically. It does have a unique pure strategy equilibrium for
a large parameter space. Fig. 3 shows the equilibrium fares, profits, departure
times and relative welfare for a range of β.
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Figure 3: Varying β in a Stackelberg game (a/b = 10, γ = β)
As expected, the second mover in this game has an advantage, since the first
mover has to choose a position that can not be undercut profitably. Hence, the
first operator’s departure time is close to the outer market boundary, and its
price is lower than in the corresponding Nash game. Naturally, it is therefore
optimal for the second operator to set an earlier departure time and higher fare
than it would do in a Nash game. As the value of schedule delay increases, re-
sulting in a lower travel demand, the first operator can choose a more favorable
position, as undercutting becomes less profitable. For very high values of sched-
ule delay, the second-mover advantage all but disappears, and the equilibrium
locations approach those of the Nash game.
Fares chosen before departure times
This game is similar to the previous, but has four separate stages; f1, f2, t1
and t2 are chosen in that order. Again, the resulting equilibrium is asymmetric;
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the second operator has a second-mover advantage, so ∗1 < ∗2. Undercutting is
still possible, and can still be profitable, especially for small values of schedule
delay, but the first operator can again avoid this. It can be shown numerically
that this game has an equilibrium for at least some values of β.
Departure times chosen before fares
The equilibrium of this game, in which t1, t2, f1 and f2 are chosen in that
order, is the most tedious to compute, as only the last subgame has a closed form.
However, numerical simulations show that, for all β ≥ 0.32a/b, a pure-strategy
equilibrium exists; this is a considerably smaller space than in the Nash game
in which both operators set their departure times at the same time, followed by
a simultaneous fare decision.
6.2. Regulation
As we have seen, operators can use their departure times as strategic instru-
ments, and hence, regulation may be desired. Even if the first-best solution, in
which fares are zero and departure times given by Eq. 8, is not feasible, it may
be possible for the regulator to set either fares or departure times. The operators
would then be free to set the remaining variables afterwards. This requires that
regulators can commit to the choices they announce; operators must be con-
vinced that the announced fares or departure times will not be changed after
they have announced their own decisions. If, for any reason, regulator cannot
commit, the game collapses from a two-stage game to a simultaneous game, in
which the regulator and the operators effectively set fares and departure times
simultaneously.
Hence, at least four different games should be considered; two sequential
games, in which regulators set either fares (FST ) or departure times (TSF ),
and two simultaneous games. Fig. 4 shows the performance of each game,
relative to the first-best social optimum, for the range of β in which each game
has an equilibrium.
Interestingly, all four games have stable equilibria over a large range of values
of schedule delay, while only the first, in which the regulator sets the departure
times, followed by a competitive pricing stage, has a stable equilibrium in an
unregulated market. In reality, completely unregulated public transport mar-
kets are a rare occurrence, so this may explain why we usually observe stable
equilibria. Indeed, there is some evidence that deregulation can lead to service
instability (e.g. Douglas, 1987). However, even the regulatory games do not
have equilibria for all possible values of schedule delay. In particular, the games
in which the regulator sets fares are unstable for small values of β.
As Fig. 4 shows, regulators have a first-mover advantage, regardless of which
variable they are controlling; welfare in each sequential games is always higher
than welfare in the corresponding simultaneous game. However, this advantage
is relatively small for most parameters. A game in which departure times are
chosen by the regulator is preferred, from a social perspective, if values of time
are low. Conversely, when values of schedule delay, a game in which the reg-
ulator chooses fares performs better. This may sound counterintuitive since,
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Figure 4: Relative welfare of regulatory games
when values of schedule delay are low, suboptimal departure times are rela-
tively unimportant compared to suboptimal fares, so one would expect a more
efficient outcome if the regulator set the latter. This does not happen because,
for low values of schedule delay, the private operators set low fares anyway; it
is better for the regulator to set the departure times, even if they are relatively
unimportant. If values of schedule delay are high, on the other hand, the oper-
ators would exercise their increased market power and raise fares far above the
optimum; it would then be better for the regulator to set the fares instead, even
though suboptimal departure times are also relatively costly.
Of the four games in Fig. 4, only the first, in which the regulator sets the
departure times, followed by a competitive pricing stage, has a stable equilibrium
in an unregulated market. A comparison of the relative welfare in this game to
the bottom right-hand panel in Fig. 1 shows that the increase in social welfare
that results from regulatory intervention is relatively small, especially for small
values of schedule delay. Only when β is very high, such that small deviations
from the optimal departure times have a large effect on social welfare, is the
regulatory game much more efficient.
7. Conclusions
We have shown that the inclusion of price-sensitive demand in a traditional
Hotelling model with price setting can yield equilibria even if transport costs
are linear. For many applications, this produces more attractive results than a
similar model with fixed demand and quadratic travel costs, as equilibria in our
model can be interior and do not necessarily result in minimum differentiation,
and never in maximum differentiation. Indeed, the two competitors normally
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locate closer together than optimal. This happens because, when demand is
price-sensitive, operators have incentives to schedule their services closer to the
inner market boundary than to the outer edges of the market, since the inner
market boundary can be pushed in the direction of the competitor, while the
outer edges of the market are fixed. Games where prices are chosen before or
simultaneously with locations, on the other hand, have no stable Nash equilibria.
We have also shown that it is possible to include asymmetric travel cost func-
tions, which can be interpreted as asymmetric schedule delay functions in our
model. Asymmetric schedule delay functions generally lower the relative welfare
of the game. Since asymmetric schedule delay functions result in asymmetric
equilibria, they do make calculation of the equilibria much more difficult, and
for some parameters result in unstable equilibria if undercutting is profitable.
A Stackelberg structure, in which one operator sets its decision variables
before the other often helps to establish equilibria in games where they are
not normally present. In these games, the first mover can deliberately choose a
position such that its competitor has no incentives to undercut; hence, there is a
second-mover advantage. Similarly, regulation can create equilbria in situations
where an unregulated market fails to do so.
The models proposed above are one way of modeling scheduling decisions
of transport operators; contrary to some of the previous literature, it succeeds
in finding equilibria. Even though these models are simple, they do show that
departure times can be strategic instruments, and should therefore be of interest
to regulators. If the socially optimal locations and prices are not attainable,
regulating one of these two variables can result in a small efficiency improvement;
the value of schedule delay determines which of the two results in the greatest
gain.
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